

Khreesat Advises

Partial Summary of Interviews with Marwan Khreesat

FD302 format, compiled by Special Agent Edward Marshman, FBI, November 1989. Crown production 1851. Portions read at trial by agent Marshman (witness no. 540), day 76, Dec 5 2000, and transcribed.

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(Added information from trial in green)

Page 1

(Questioning, paraphrased: Marshmann introduced the account given by Mr. Khreesat by explaining that he was interviewed on November the 12th and the 13th of 1989. And that he was interviewed at the headquarters of the Jordanian Intelligence Service. You then identify those that were present, including certain members of the Jordanian Intelligence Service. Mr. Khreesat was told what the purpose of the interview was, and he was assured that he was not in custody and free to terminate the interview at any time And the introduction is completed by an explanation that his status was confirmed to him by a General Samih Battiki, [apparently] the director of the Jordanian Intelligence Service.)

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He [Khreesat] arrived in Belgrade at the airport and was met by Abu Fuad. This was the first time that Khreesat met Abu Fuad and did not know him by any other name. The name Mobdi Goben is not familiar to Khreesat.

Abu Fuad took Khreesat to a house that was rented by another family. The house was not owned by Abu Fuad. Fuad lived approximately 200 kilometres from Belgrade.

Page 2

(second paragraph)

Before Khreesat left for Yugoslavia, he met his GID case officer, who instructed him not to arm any explosive devices while in Yugoslavia. He was told to build any improvised explosive device necessary, but he was instructed to alter the device so that it would not detonate even if used against an Israeli target.

Khreesat was told by his case officer that he would be protected while in Yugoslavia.

Page 3 (nothing given)

Page 4 (nothing given)

Page 5

(very top of the page)

The Germans also asked Khreesat about Abu Elias. Khreesat advised that he did not tell the Germans anything about Abu Elias. Khreesat never saw Abu Elias in Germany, but was told by Dalkamoni that Abu Elias had arrived. (This occurred on October the 22nd, 1988) Khreesat told the Germans that they should have waited one more day to make the arrests, as Dalkamoni was on the way to meet Abu Elias when they were arrested. Khreesat did not know the function of Abu Elias in Yugoslavia, nor did he know the purpose of the meeting that was to be held in Yugoslavia.

Photo number 1 (Abu Nada): Khreesat does not know.

Photograph number 2, (Mobdi Goben aka Abu Fuad) Khreesat identified this individual as Abu Fuad. Khreesat does not know Fuad by an other name. Fuad has been in Yugoslavia a long time and is married to a Yugoslavian. Fuad's son is in the Yugoslavian army and is also known by the name Fuad. Fuad's automobile is an off-white in colour diesel

Mercedes Benz model 200. The fuel tank is divided and the contraband to be smuggled is put in this tank. Dalkamoni said that the tank is altered in

Syria at the garage of a PFLP-GC member by the name of Khaled El Fitti (phonetic spelling). El Fitti is a mechanic by trade who specializes in these alterations. Dalkamoni challenged anyone to find the hidden compartment. Khreesat speculated that the car was driven between Yugoslavia and Syria by way of Turkey. Fuad was in charge of the Yugoslavian sector of the PFLP-GC, and photograph number 2 was described as a good likeness of Abu Fuad.

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Photograph number 6 (Khaled Jaafar) Khreesat does not know.

Photograph number 7 (Hashem Abassi). Khreesat only knows Abassi from his trip to Germany in October 1988. Abassi and Dalkamoni are married to sisters. While in Germany, Khreesat stayed at Abassi's house. Abassi had his wife and one son with him. The son's name is Mohamed. Abassi and his wife owned and worked a supermarket in Neuss. Khreesat was told by Dalkamoni that Abassi had no function in the movement; they just provided a place to stay. Abassi's wife did not have anything to do with the movement either.

Photograph 9, Martin Kadorah.

Page 7

Photograph number 13 (Ahmed Abassi).

Khreesat identifies this individual as Hashem Abassi's brother, first name Ahmed or Mohamed. Ahmed Abassi and his family live in Sweden. Four days before the arrests, he came by himself to visit Hashem.

Khreesat does not know if Ahmed was arrested. Ahmed is an auto mechanic and Dalkamoni told Khreesat that Ahmed is not a member of the group or movement. Khreesat does not know how Ahmed traveled to Germany. Ahmed does not know the nature of Khreesat's work, although one time Ahmed knocked on Khreesat's door when Khreesat was working

on a device and asked for a screwdriver. Ahmed returned it when he was done. Khreesat does not know if Ahmed saw any of the devices or any of the internal components. Dalkamoni slept in this room when Khreesat was not working on the devices. The night before the arrests, Dalkamoni wanted to purchase another tuner. They took Ahmed as a translator and went to two stores but were unable to locate a suitable tuner. Khreesat noted that he was then [sic] one who determined if an instrument was suitable for conversion into an IED.

Khreesat did not have any preconceived ideas of what models were good, but selected the devices based upon internal size. Ahmed Abassi was not involved with the group, and on the day of the arrests, Dalkamoni and Khreesat gave him a ride to his brother's store. After they dropped him off, they were arrested. Khreesat and Dalkamoni were on their way to meet Abu Elias when they were arrested.

Page 8

(bottom entry)

photograph number 39, Moussa Magdy

Khreesat does not know, but the face looks familiar, and he may have seen him somewhere before.

Page 9 (Nothing given)

Page 10

(third paragraph)

Before Dalkamoni's absence, Dalkamoni introduced Khreesat to Abu Elias. (phonetic spelling). Dalkamoni said that Abu Elias was an expert in airport security. In 1987 Abu Elias was shown one of the BomBeat 453s that Khreesat worked on in 1985.

In 1985 Khreesat was summoned to Syria by Ahmed Jibril to build IEDs that were concealed. He bought five BomBeat 453s in Damascus, Syria, at a marketplace known as Smuggler's Row. Khreesat worked on the five devices, and of the five, two were almost ready to go; they only needed to have the pins pulled to arm them. One had only explosives inside with no altimeter or timer. The other two needed two wires to be connected. After Khreesat built these devices, they were shown to Ahmed Jibril, who approved them. Khreesat then disassembled the devices, and the components were taken back to the PFLP-GC office. The radios themselves were left in Khreesat's cousin's house. When someone was sent to this house to pick up the five radios, the cousins took one of the radios for their own use, and only four were picked up. The fifth BomBeat 453 stayed upstairs at the house. Khreesat's wife later reclaimed this radio from the cousins, and this was the radio that Khreesat's wife took to West Germany to give to her brother, who was in prison. Khreesat's wife was unable to give this radio to her brother, and this radio was left in Hashem Abassi's house. This radio was clean, and Khreesat assumes that it was seized by the Germans. The BomBeat 453 that Khreesat built in Germany was one of these five radios that he worked on in 1985. Of the other three radios he had in 1985, Khreesat saw one in an office in Syria being used as a regular radio.

Page 11

"Chronology of Activities While in Germany, October 1988."

13 October, Thursday:

When Khreesat was summoned to Germany by Dalkamoni, Khreesat's wife desired to go along with him to Germany in order to see her brother, who is in prison. Dalkamoni agreed to allow Khreesat's wife to accompany him to Germany. They flew to Germany on October 13, 1988, and arrived at Frankfurt Airport, Frankfurt. When they arrived they

were met at the airport by Dalkamoni. At the airport they spent some time looking at maps, as they wanted to find the location of Diez, which is where the wife's brother is imprisoned. They also did some sightseeing and then went to the residence of Hashem Abassi. Abassi's residence is in the city of Norf, which is very close to Neuss, according to Khreesat. When they arrived at Abassi's apartment, three young men were there. These three men left as soon as Khreesat, his wife, and Dalkamoni arrived. When Dalkamoni asked who they were, Abassi said that they were three men who were applying for asylum in Sweden.

Khreesat advised that he never saw the three again and would not be able to identify them. It did not appear as if Dalkamoni knew the three either. One of the three was allegedly the brother of Dalil Al Mougrabi, who is a well-known female who conducted operations against Israel. Khreesat thinks that the three were later arrested in Sweden.

(last sentence of the last paragraph on that page)

He was unable to advise why the three were in Abassi's residence.

Page 12 (nothing given)

Page 13

October 15, Saturday

On Saturday, Dalkamoni wanted to look at different electrical devices. Dalkamoni and Khreesat had to go to the stores early, as the stores were closed in the afternoon. They went to several stores but did not purchase anything. Dalkamoni told Khreesat that they would go to Dusseldorf later to continue to look for suitable appliances. Khreesat advised that it was his decision as to what items to purchase. He was looking for tuners and monitors with no particular brand or model in mind. Khreesat advised that he preferred older models, as the newer models are digital and much

more compact. It is harder to alter a newer model, since there is less room inside.

Page 14 (nothing given)

Page 15 (nothing given)

Page 16

October 18, Tuesday

(middle of the page)

On Tuesday, Khreesat and Dalkamoni went to Dusseldorf. Khreesat is not sure if they took his wife. They went to a large store where the second floor contained a large stock of second-hand electrical appliances. At this store they found and bought the two tuners. The tuners were of different brands. They then went to a second store and found and purchased the monitor. They also bought some tools when they bought the monitor. After this, they returned home.

(last paragraph)

On this Tuesday or Wednesday, Dalkamoni brought the explosive into the house. The plastic explosive was in a box and weighed approximately two to two and one-half kilogrammes. Dalkamoni said that he brought it from Frankfurt and it was a good explosive. Khreesat advised that it was understood that there was a supply or storage place somewhere in Frankfurt, but Khreesat was unaware of the exact location. The explosive was in a brown box with wax paper. There was some type of writing on the wrapping, but Khreesat does not recall what language, other than it was not Arabic.

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Dalkamoni also brought in four blasting caps that were electrical. In the room in Abassi's residence where Khreesat built the IEDs, he also found

the four timers. These timers were made in the Fatah factory. There were also four altimeters which were made in Japan. Khreesat also found the BomBeat 453 in this room. According to Khreesat, Dalkamoni was the only other person to go into this room or to provide him with these materials.

Khreesat was unable to elaborate on the location or details of the storage location in Frankfurt. The address, Sandweg 28, is not familiar to Khreesat.

19 October, Wednesday

Khreesat advised that he is unable to positively differentiate between what he did on Tuesday and what he did on Wednesday, as these two days blend together. He believes that they bought some smallboxes that went into the tuners. These boxes were plastic, and black in colour. They also bought some batteries. In the same store that they purchased the other items, they also bought some small digital alarm clocks.

Dalkamoni thought that they could use the digital timers on the IED intended for use at the nightclub. Khreesat said that he did not like the digital timers, as he did not know how to use them. Khreesat advised that Dalkamoni liked to buy different things. He lived quite well off of the PFLP-GC expense account and did not mind buying things. If he could not use the item for the operation, he would convert it to his own use.

They bought a child's radio (brand name Kamiki) at the same place as the tuners were bought. Also on this day Dalkamoni brought the tools from Masoud's place to Hashem Abassi's residence.

Khreesat stated that nothing else of consequence happened on Tuesday. That night he opened up the electrical appliances and looked inside, but did not begin to convert them into IEDs.

Page 18 (nothing given)

Page 19 (nothing given)

Page 20

22nd of October, Saturday

(first paragraph)

Khreesat's wife was flying back to Amman in Jordan. They did some shopping and then she left. One of the bags that she was carrying contained her brother's clothes. On Monday, when she went to the prison with Ghada, Mrs. Khreesat was given her brother's clothes. The prison had taken away all of his clothes and possessions and they gave them to Mrs. Khreesat.

After leaving the airport, Dalkamoni drove to the zoo. He told Khreesat to go in, and he would return in one hour to pick him up. While in the zoo, Khreesat saw a telephone booth and tried to call his case officer in Jordan, but was unable to reach him (due to the holiday in Jordan).

Approximately one hour later, Dalkamoni returned to the zoo and picked up Khreesat. They then drove toward the Norf area.

(fifth paragraph down)

There was a lot of traffic on the way home, and on the trip Dalkamoni mentioned that Abu Elias had arrived in Germany that day. Previously Dalkamoni had said that Abu Elias was coming to Germany. Khreesat

asked Dalkamoni why Khreesat was there if Abu Elias was such an expert. Dalkamoni replied that Abu Elias was an expert in airport security and Khreesat was the expert in building the IEDs. Abu Elias was of concern to Khreesat because Khreesat felt that he could not render the IEDs inoperable as Abu Elias would probably know it.

(final paragraph)

That night Dalkamoni brought the boxes, located in the trunk of Dalkamoni's car, into the Abassi residence. Khreesat does not know where the items came from but assumes they were obtained by Dalkamoni when he left Khreesat at the zoo for the hour. Khreesat has no idea where Dalkamoni went or who he met. Khreesat speculated that Dalkamoni may have met Abu Elias, as on the way back to Neuss from the zoo, Dalkamoni mentioned that Abu Elias was in Germany. Khreesat also speculated that Dalkamoni may have gone to the storage house.

Page 21

(first paragraph)

Contained in the boxes were two handheld two-way radios and one mobile radio (similar to a unit that would be installed in an automobile). Also in the boxes was the fifth device, which was a Toshiba radio/cassette recorder.

This device is further described infra. Khreesat does not know where the radio came from. It was not in a new box.

The rest of the evening of this day Khreesat began working on building the IEDs.

23 October, Sunday;

Khreesat spent most of Sunday in the residence working on the construction of the IEDs. A number of visitors came to the residence, but Khreesat did not meet them, and he does not know their identities.

During the day, Dalkamoni came into the workroom with the fifth device. Dalkamoni told Khreesat that two wires had to be soldered together. Khreesat took the device and positioned it so that the front (face) was towards him, and then he put it face down on the work table. Khreesat removed two or three screws and then removed the cover after flipping the device over onto its back. Khreesat saw a speaker on the right side of the radio. Dalkamoni reached over and pulled the speaker out. Dalkamoni then pointed to two wires and told Khreesat to solder these two wires together. Khreesat told Dalkamoni that he would have to test the device before soldering the two wires together. Dalkamoni told Khreesat not to check the device first, which Khreesat found very strange, as Dalkamoni, in his prior dealings with Khreesat, had always stressed that Khreesat had to be very careful and always double-check everything. Khreesat checked the device first anyway, to ensure that there was no current in the circuit, and then soldered the two wires together.

Khreesat could not see the explosive charge in the fifth device. He saw a couple of small cardboard boxes with writing on them, but does not know what was concealed under these boxes. Khreesat advised that the cardboard boxes did not belong in the Toshiba radio. Some of the radio's components were missing, including the transformer and about one-half of the circuit board. The circuit board is normally L-shaped, but part of the L had been removed.

Khreesat saw part of an altimeter under the cassette part of the device. Khreesat told Dalkamoni that the device was not very good, as the authorities could very easily discover that the radio had been altered into an IED.

Khreesat asked Dalkamoni if the IED would detonate if taken to high elevations while driving. Dalkamoni said it would not detonate and further stated that he was going to Frankfurt, and the road to Frankfurt was level with no hills or mountains.

Khreesat was aware that some devices were to be used in the mail. (In 1970 the PFLP-GC had used the mail to get IEDs aboard aircraft). Khreesat does not know any of the details as to exactly how the devices were going to be put on board aircraft or how they were to be mailed. Abu Elias had all of the details about how to get the IEDs on the aircraft.

Khreesat and Dalkamoni were on their way to meet Abu Elias on Wednesday, October 26th, 1988, when they were arrested.

The only details Khreesat could describe concerning how the PFLP-GC put IEDs aboard aircraft were historical. Around 1970 the PFLP-GC used the mail system. In the 1970s, the group

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started to use unwitting couriers. The group would locate an unwitting female and the operative would propose marriage after establishing a relationship. The operative would send the unwitting female ahead and give the IED package to her to carry.

24 October, Monday

Second paragraph

Around 2.00 p.m. Khreesat took a shower. When Khreesat was in the shower, Dalkamoni knocked on the door and said that he was leaving to go to Frankfurt. After getting out of the shower, Khreesat went back to work on the IEDs. At this time he noticed that the fifth device was no longer in the workroom. He did not pay a lot of attention to this, as he was thinking about the upcoming meeting with Abu Elias. Khreesat speculated that Dalkamoni took the fifth device with him, as only Khreesat and Dalkamoni ever went into the room. After working on the IEDs until late that evening, Khreesat went to bed.

(the foot of that page)

At this time Khreesat was asked to recall his actions on October 22nd, 1988 at Frankfurt Airport, after his wife left to return to Amman in Jordan. Khreesat did not recall making any statements about Pan Am. He recalls that on that day Dalkamoni --

Page 24.

said a lot of people were going to the United States and some airlines left a couple of times a day. Dalkamoni did not mention any specific airline.

25 October, Tuesday

On Tuesday, Khreesat and Dalkamoni went to Dusseldorf to look for timers and tuners. Dalkamoni wanted to find more tuners, although Khreesat was of the opinion that they should not waste their time, as they did not have any parts to convert any more tuners into IEDs. They found some timers that resembled kitchen timers and purchased five to seven of them. They also purchased some clothes for Khreesat.

(next paragraph)

At one point in the day, they stopped at a coffee shop. Across from the coffee shop was a telephone booth. Khreesat made a quick call to his case officer but could not discuss much because Dalkamoni was present. Khreesat advised that whenever he made a telephone call, Dalkamoni stood right there and listened in. When advised that the German surveillance report indicates that the telephone call was 45 minutes in length, Khreesat said that this was obviously wrong, and the call was probably 4.5 minutes, not 45 minutes. Khreesat advised that it is impossible to make a 45-minute call to Jordan from a German telephone booth.

As concerns the telephone call to his case officer, Khreesat told his case officer that he had prepared a device and given it to Abu Elias. Khreesat advised that he had assumed that the fifth device went to Abu Elias, as related above. Khreesat also said that the group had targeted Israeli aircraft. Khreesat apologised for not being able to remember all of the details, but stated that his recollection decreases as time passes.

After this telephone call, Dalkamoni and Khreesat went to the Dusseldorf Airport. They walked around and Dalkamoni picked up several airline timetables. One was for Pan Am, and Dalkamoni also picked up timetables for Swissair and KLM. When Khreesat saw the Pan Am logo, he made the connection to Frankfurt Airport.

Page 25

(first paragraph)

As previously related, on October 22nd, 1988, Dalkamoni made some comments at Frankfurt Airport when Khreesat's wife left to return to Jordan. Dalkamoni noted that the airlines were under a lot of pressure, as there were multiple flights per day. At the time Khreesat only recognised

that it was an American carrier. At Dusseldorf Airport, Dalkamoni picked up Pan Am brochure and Khreesat recognised the logo, which he described as blue and looked like the sun with lines through it. When he saw the Pan Am logo on the brochure, he realized that Dalkamoni had been commenting on Pan Am when they were at Frankfurt Airport.

(middle)

After leaving the Dusseldorf Airport, they went to Neuss and Abassi's supermarket. After this, they went shopping for more clothing. They then went to a tourism office. Dalkamoni wanted to look at flight schedules, as he needed a flight going from one city in Spain to another city in Spain and then on to Israel. They found Iberia 888, which went from Madrid to Barcelona to Tel Aviv. Dalkamoni did not say which date he wanted to target the flight, but Dalkamoni wanted to target a flight in the next week. The plan for the Iberia flight would be to have someone get on the flight in Madrid with the BomBeat 453 IED and then get off at Barcelona. Just before getting off the plane in Barcelona, the courier would arm the device by inserting a pin into the radio to arm it. The device would then detonate on the Barcelona to Tel Aviv leg of the flight.

(next paragraph)

A After leaving the tourism office, they went back to Hashem Abassi's supermarket. When they reached the market, they met Ahmed Abassi. Dalkamoni was pleased that Ahmed Abassi was there, as he speaks German and could help them by translating. They took Ahmed Abassi with them to a couple of stores to look for tuners, but did not find anything they wanted.

They then went to a garage and fixed a flat tyre and then went home to Hashem Abassi's residence.

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25 October, Tuesday

Dalkamoni called Ahmed Jibril that night and told him that all the devices were ready. Dalkamoni mentioned three people, and Khreesat believes that these names equate to three cities. Khreesat does not know which three cities they referred to. Dalkamoni also asked Ahmed Jibril for permission to start the operations. Jibril gave his consent to start. Dalkamoni also asked Jibril to talk to Khreesat (who is referred to as Abu Safi). Khreesat got on the phone with Jibril, who said to go to a medical doctor and get a check-up so that he could use health as a reason for overstaying his visa in Germany. (Khreesat further advised that the group was ready to pay off a German doctor to get an excuse for overstaying his visa). After this, Khreesat and Jibril talked about using glue to cover up the smell of the explosive.

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26 October, Wednesday

On Wednesday Khreesat woke up smelling something burning, as the Abassis had left the coffee on. Khreesat turned off the stove and cleaned up the burned pot and the kitchen. Dalkamoni was happy, as all the cleaning would have taken all the residue of the explosive off of Khreesat's hands.

Dalkamoni took the BomBeat 453 and his briefcase and put them in the trunk of the car. Khreesat also saw the approximately 300-gramme chunk of explosive that was intended for the nightclub in the trunk. When Dalkamoni brought down the BomBeat 453, he also brought down the rest of the explosive and put this in the trunk also. (This was the

residue of the chunk of explosive from which Khreesat had cut off chunks for the other four devices).

Dalkamoni and Khreesat then drove to Hashem Abassi's supermarket. They had Ahmed Abassi with them and were going to drop him off. They also wanted to ask Hashem Abassi about a medical doctor. When they arrived at the supermarket, Dalkamoni and Ahmed Abassi went into the store, and Khreesat went across the street to make a telephone call.

Khreesat attempted to call his case officer in Jordan and more fully explain what was going on while Dalkamoni was in the store. However, there were three people ahead of Khreesat waiting to make calls and Khreesat had to wait a while. When he finally got in the booth and was able to make his call to his case officer, Dalkamoni came out of the store and walked over to the booth and opened the door of the booth. Khreesat pretended that he was talking to his wife and ended the conversation quickly. Dalkamoni told Khreesat that they were going to go to Frankfurt. They walked a few feet and were then arrested.

Page 28 (nothing given)

Page 29

The GID officers produced a composite sketch of Abu Elias that was done by Khreesat some time ago. Khreesat examined the composite and affirmed that the likeness was that of Abu Elias who he met in Damascus, Syria. This composite is attached to this FD302.

(last para)

Khreesat was shown a photograph of a Toshiba BomBeat 453 radio/cassette recorder. Khreesat said that this radio (photo marked A)

was not the one he worked on, as the one he worked on had a plug in the side. The plug was nickel-coloured, and Khreesat installed it in Abassi's residence. The BomBeat 453 was one of the radios that he bought on Smuggler's Street in Damascus, Syria, in 1985. Khreesat advised that in 1985 he first bought one, opened it up, found that it was suitable, and then bought four more.

Page 30

(second para)

Khreesat advised that the photograph marked B is a photo of the Toshiba BomBeat model 453 radio/cassette recorder that he converted into an IED. The explosive was contained in a white packet.

Page 31 (nothing given)

Page 32

(second para)

Photo E depicts one of the timers he used. When queried as to how he made his electrical connections, Khreesat advised that all of the circuit board connections were soldered and the wire to wire connections were soldered and then taped. The tape was not meant to hold the wires together, but rather was used to insulate the connection.

(next two)

Khreesat does not know what the numbers on the timers indicate. The timers were made by the Fatah group in Damascus. He first saw these timers at the PFLP-GC camp in Syria and four of them were good, so he took them to use. One of the timers was a half-hour timer, one was for three-quarters of an hour, and one was for one hour. Khreesat does not recall what time the fourth timer was set for. None of the timers were for more than one hour. Khreesat advised that the times are not exact and

the time changes depending upon how long the timers have been tested after last being used. They usually reset to zero after a day. He used to test the timers three times in a row before installing the timer in a device. He found that in each test the time decreased. When this happened, he put the timers aside, and the next day when he tested them, they would run for the same time as when he had first started them.

(next paragraph)

Of the four timers he used in the IEDs in Germany, he is not sure of the exact times each one was set for, or which device which timer was put into.

These four are the same four that he used in 1985 in Damascus. He does not know how they were smuggled into Germany or by whom. Similarly, the altimeters are the same ones he had in 1985. He does not know how, when, or by whom these altimeters were smuggled into Germany either.

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(last para)

The second IED that Khreesat built was an ultrasound tuner, model ST5000. An ultrasound tuner is depicted in photographs K1 through K11. Photos K1 through K4 are external photos, and photos K5 through K8 are internal photographs of the tuner and depict the boxes Khreesat added. Khreesat advised that this tuner did not have an external arming pin.

Page 34

(bottom)

The third device was another tuner, model GPM 8000T. Khreesat identified photos L1 through L5 as external photos of the tuner, and

photos L7 through L9 as internal photos of the tuner. L6 is a schematic diagram that Khreesat said accurately depicts the circuit in the device. This tuner did not have an arming device. The altimeter and timer were in the same box, which was a large box. He does not remember the exact locations of the altimeter and the timer within the plastic box. The explosive and battery were in the same box. Khreesat also stated that this tuner worked.

(next paragraph)

The fourth device was a Sanyo monitor. Khreesat identified photos M1 through M7 as components of this monitor. M1 is the explosive that was in the monitor. Again, it was wrapped in aluminium foil, tape, and covered with glue.

Page 35

(In the middle of the page)

The IEDs were not booby-trapped. He did not booby-trap the devices, because this would have prevented him from altering, testing, fixing, or modifying the devices at a later time if he had to.

(third last paragraph)

Khreesat was queried as to his knowledge of other IED builders in the PFLP-GC. He advised that he does not know of any other bomb builders, but advised there must be some others as the PFLP-GC successfully built and used IEDs against aircraft before. In 1969 the PFLP-GC bombed a Swissair plane. Khreesat advised that he is unaware of the identities of any bomb builders outside of the PFLP-GC. Khreesat never trained anyone, either inside or outside of the PFLP-GC, in how to build IEDs.

(second paragraph)

Photographs marked P and Q are the circuit board that is common to Toshiba radio/cassette recorders models RT-8016, RT-8026, SF-16, and SF-26. Khreesat was shown the photographs, at which time he advised that he has never worked on a circuit board that looks like this.

At this point in the interview, Khreesat was shown a red Toshiba model SF-16 radio/cassette recorder. Khreesat advised that he has never worked on a radio like that, as he only worked on one-speaker radios. (The SF-16 has two speakers). The SF-16 was disassembled, and Khreesat advised that he would not use an SF-16 to build into an IED, as there is not enough empty space inside to put the components in. Khreesat advised that he would not remove any parts to gain more space, as then the radio would not work as it is supposed to. It is very important that the radio operate as it is supposed to, so that the device will not be detected. Security personnel often check to see if electronic devices actually work before they will pass them. Looking at the disassembled radio, Khreesat advised that it could only hold about 100 grammes of plastic explosive, or about the amount that would fit in a cigarette pack.

Khreesat was then asked to further describe the fifth device that he saw in Germany. (The device that was brought to him by Dalkamoni and in which Khreesat connected two wires). Khreesat was shown a photospread of radios (photo marked R) and advised that the fifth device is not depicted in this photospread.

Khreesat said that the Toshiba BomBeat 453 is similar to the fifth device. The main differences were that there were two small switches on top of

the radio instead of one slide switch. These two switches were toggle type and moved up and down. There is also a round knob on the top, not a flat one. The body of the radio was also a little thicker.

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(last page)

(the paragraph in the middle)

Khreesat is sure that the fifth device was also a Toshiba radio/cassette recorder. When shown a catalogue of Toshiba products, Khreesat said the fifth device looked exactly like a model RT-F423 radio/cassette recorder. It was bronze in colour just like the model in the catalogue. Khreesat further advised that he thinks the original switch on the top, the third to the right, was replaced with one from the side of the radio. The knob on the side of the radio is round, and it looks like the flat knob on the top of the radio was replaced with a knob similar to the one on the side.

(last paragraph)

Khreesat advised that he does not know what type of device was used to bring down Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988. Khreesat advised that he does not think he built the device responsible for Pan Am 103, as he only built the four devices in Germany which are described herein.